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THE J. HABERMAS'S PHILOSOPHY CONCEPT "LIFEWORLD" AS A NOTION OF PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

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A certain parallel between the ancient philosophers' ethical points and possible explanation of the history in the present was revealed. The thinkers developing the interpretations of the communicative philosophy in particular in the philosophy of history were noticed. A preliminary analysis of the K.-O.Apel's theory of communicative society through the view of the philosophy of history was revised. A formally pragmatic analysis of a life-world as a part of J. Habermas's theory of communicative action was investigated. It has been worked up from proposed analysis the background knowledge and it was also revised through the view of philosophy of history. A possibility of using life-world background knowledge in investigations of science historical dimensions was pointed out. It was demonstrated on the examples the validity of such interpretation of the life-world. The opportunity to relieve the tension between actually given and what should be was presented.

Keywords: communicative philosophy, philosophy of history, life-world, mutual understanding, intersubjective recognition.

History quite often undergoes various distortions. Subject of history is connected with history of authority therefore it become an object of manipulation and readjustment which are profitable for authorities. As a study about human relationships it undergoes certain interpretations from researchers. As a social science it describes attitudes of society in a certain period of time, but also influences on it in present. Philosophy as the art of living developed yet in the period of antiquity. History is an art of describing lived. So there is some valid parallels between views on perception of historical events and ancient philosopher's views on how to live. There are three certain points of view. Cynicism – indifference to history. Skepticism – rejection all historical assessments, because they cannot be correct. Eudaimonia – taking for granted historical statements. Actuality of research caused by some geopolitical reasons, in particular the desire to impose a colonial model of history on the territory of post-colonial space that already in their premise is controversial endeavor.

Today communicative philosophy is one of the most powerful trends in contemporary philosophy. Therefore development and the level of problems elaboration that it contains are high abroad, and in Ukrainian philosophical tradition. In English tradition the main researchers are T. McCarthy, N. Fraser, A. Edgar and others. In German philosophical tradition there are A. Honneth, V. Hösle and other. The representatives of this philosophical tradition researchers in Ukraine are A. Ermolenko, L. Sytnichenko, V. Kuplin. In Russia, the tasks which tries to solve

communicative philosophy, explores A. Nazarchuk. Communicative philosophy of history was explored by V. Kuplin.

Presented above parallel from antiquity shows how one can take these or those historical interpretations, how to operate the *content*. But it says nothing about how to make the research itself, which should be a *form*.

The aim of our research is to show how one can apply the philosophical concept of "lifeworld", submitted through the prism of formal-pragmatic analysis that Habermas made, in the methodology of historical research.

K.-O. Apel usually represents communicative philosophy of history. This is due to the specific of thinker's creative heritage: an attempt to deduce the opportunity of ethics ultimate justification based on the theory of communicative society.

One of the ultimate justification conditions in "community of argumentation" is "recognition of all its members as equal discussion partners" [1, p. 393].

Later, in the context due to the H. Jonas's book "The imperative of Responsibility" philosopher notes: "thanks to the recognition of the fundamental equality of all potential participants of discourse it is necessary to be responsible for predictable problems that will result from present situation and needs of future people [2, p. 176–177]. The potential participants of discourse are not so much imaginary or yet unborn persons as the youngest generation, which only later be able to become an actual member of the discourse and reproduce relative to itself youngest generation, which is now actually does not exist. The assertion that the existing "today community of human communication must make possible it's own continuous extension in future only if the equality" [2, p. 177], shows historical continuity of the theory of communicative society. As V. Kuplin noticed: "Apel understand the historical process as progress in the convergence of real and ideal community of communication, that is progress in interpersonal understanding and self-understanding" [5, p. 11]. Even in "transformation of philosophy" K.-O. Apel considers the tension between the community of real communication and the community of ideal communication "in the dialectic spirit between the positions of Hegel and Marx" [1, p. 417].

Above noticed certain interest in the works of founder of theory of communicative society through the view of philosophy of history. It is believed that in stream of philosophy of history because of clear expression of the historical moment in the tension between real and ideal communities of communication, relationships between philosophy of history and social philosophy, paid insufficient attention to the J. Habermas's theory of communicative action. This condition makes actual task of inquiry J. Habermas's theory through the point of philosophy of history. The inquiry is focused on the formal-pragmatic analysis of the concept "lifeworld". Appropriate concept E. Husserl introduced to design ontological opposition to philosophy of positivism. The founder of phenomenology briefly described the life-world as "the only actual, actually given in senses, perceived and something that is learned in the experience of the world. Later, his follower, founder of phenomenological sociology, A. Schutz transferred this concept to the level of social research [6, p. 89]. J. Habermas begins his analysis of the life-world, based exactly on the E. Husserl's and A. Schutz's legacy, and defines this concept as "changeable context of natural vital practice and experience as established basis of meaning"; "as unmediated, connected with time area of primary givens" [3, p. 310].

According to formal-pragmatic comments concerning lifeworld as the basis of mutual understanding, J. Habermas divides it on two levels: relating to the situation knowledge and

defined by horizon vision, and knowledge dependent of the topic context, which are involved in foreground knowledge (Vordergrundwissen), and background knowledge (Hintergrundwissen).

Describing knowledge defined by vision horizon one must begin from the person, which is involved into communicative process and understood as an organic substrate and an external body. "The central point of the speech situation is presented by circumstances in perception" [3, p. 311]. Center for speech situation serves process of interaction between two or more persons. Against the background of common space-time horizon individuals interpret trivial things more or less agreed: previous disagreements surrounding speech situation in the communication process becomes more diffuse and "erased", creates favorable field of unproblematic knowledge, common for participants of communication, for the assimilation of situation, which, however, each interprets in his own way, despite the gradual convergence "here and now perspectives".

Thematic knowledge of the context, the speaker's assumptions, are within a common environment and horizon of experience: through a common cultural tradition, nationality, education, etc. "Offering certain topic speaker inner accompanies it's by substantive context" [3, p. 312]. For this reason is possible assessment of pronounced, removal from heard some certain piece of information, its verification for correctness. If in the first case knowledge, which is defined by horizon of vision is not problematic, the thematic context knowledge is often problematic and requires extra effort for its clarification and agreement between the speakers. This is because of the specified preconditions, which determined explicit by knowledge defined by vision horizon.

Life-world background knowledge – a deep layer of non-content knowledge that is the basis for thematic knowledge of the context and knowledge defined by vision horizon. Experiments defined by the space-time dimension and social environment and cultural traditions are unable to affect on background knowledge. Because of this it avoids problematisation. "It emerges that the layer of elliptic and forever preceding knowledge only through methodical effort, and only gradually can go beyond the undoubted grounds and become thematic" [3, p. 312]. The value of expression will always be not completely understood until its significance semantic conditions will not be intuitively "caught" by the assumption of background knowledge. Such knowledge is not problematic because it is implicit and not tematised. We always imagine anything in conditions of the force of gravity, though, as the law, it was discovered only during the period of science of Modern Time. (The reason for this discovery was doubt in an appropriate pre-theoretical practice. This doubt caused its reconsideration by methodical effort within the knowledge of background).

According to J. Habermas the main features of the background knowledge are mode of direct probability, the force that unites all, holistic nature. The first feature gives this layer of knowledge paradoxical character: "constant and at the same time invisible presence of background emerges as intensifying and to the same extent reducing knowledge" [3, p. 314]. Background knowledge appears only in time of it's pronunciation, as only then it undergoes problematisation. In moments of intuitive grip it has probabilistic character and we use it regardless of whether it true or not. Regarding to the second feature life-world "constitutes the totality centered in the middle and with uncertain, porous, ...squeezing limits" [3, p. 314]. This feature is the basis of "world-making function" of foreground knowledge. A common language situation arises as center. Otherwise we risk to be incomprehensible because the probabilistic nature of the grip of knowledge can not guarantee statements correctness when the latter is based solely on our personal beliefs. Our understanding of the life-world and the way it is intersubjective shared by all its participants must be in the same relation as text and context. The third feature is directly connected to the previous

two. Background knowledge integrity makes life world impenetrable. All the components presented in life-world background as entire. They can decay into different categories of knowledge. They can be structured and make it possible all variety of world-view only because of the ability to problematisation, and awareness of the view that is able to distinguish. "Coupled with one another basic assumption ... are pre-reflexical pre-forms and pre-figures that divides only after thematising of speech acts and takes the value of propositional knowledge, illocutionary formed interpersonal relationships of speech intentions" [3, p. 315].

Formal-pragmatic analysis of the lifeworld structure makes it possible to define his "worldly" functions and a priori features. *If background knowledge as knowledge of an intuitive level that "jumps" at the time of problematisation is recognized by communicative community, it becomes valid to constitute our understanding of the world.* Knowledge which after the impact of methodological efforts turned wrong is very useful also. On the one hand, such knowledge as the accumulation of experience, enhances the already powerful "wall" of previous contingent layers. (Such "wall" protects us from different kind of accidents. Knowledge, which necessity from time to time is questioned emerges on the surface from the layers of experience and also justify paradoxical situation): "when knowledge about the world is defined in such a way that it is a posteriori knowledge, whereas speech knowledge, is knowledge is defined as a priori, then one can see the paradox that the basis of life-world knowledge about the world and language knowledge are integrated into each other" [3, p. 315]. From the other hand understanding incorrectness and thus redefining of such knowledge serves as a motive for the periodization of history by preventing its homogeneous development. In the case of retraction of such knowledge the previous ground which was the basis of the traditional understanding at all or from the view point single discipline of the world is lost. Under these conditions it is redefining intuitively grabbed prior knowledge and approval of new knowledge. It becomes possible to justify the transition from one historical period to another: fixation intervals (and it's consideration as a particular historical period) is possible thanks to the common theme that during the whole period is intersubjectively recognized by all participants of real communication as valid. So it will be until the subject again be disproved or re-interpreted through it's consider as not new, but in new ways.

It is interesting to trace the rethinking of intuitive grip of life-world background knowledge fragments. The easiest way to do it on the well-known examples – I. Newton's classical mechanics, which is considered time as sustainable parameter, and the theory of A. Einstein, which is analyzed time as relative coordinate. In the context of formal-pragmatic analysis of the life-world should be noted that Einstein was not satisfied by contemporary interpretation of the concept of "simultaneity". He doubted that time understanding of time. This prompted him to develop and justify the theory of relativity. The latter had a revolutionary consequences not only for physics but also for a much broader outlook and understanding of the world, thereby contributing to rethinking life-world's knowledge background. Another similar example – the progress from the Ptolemaic geocentric to the heliocentric system of N. Copernicus.

Should be noticed that "spaces and times that are experienced (such as: village community, region, state, nation, world society, etc. or as a chain of generations, eras, universes, are individualized through God's biography are always concretely interpreted or objectified coordinates of our world" [3, p. 315]. This pragmatic circumstance of analysis, carried by J. Habermas, can be universal only within the formal terms. It is what for a thinker has repeatedly been criticized by contemporaries. The difference between opinions of K.-O. Apel and J. Habermas through the prism of studies of

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philosophy of history is striking. In K.-O. Apel's conception historical vector is directed to the future – on realization of ideal communication community. Opinion of J. Habermas's theory can be directed on division of past periods. Necessary to remember that this concept of "life-world" proposed by J. Habermas makes it possible to effortlessly remove the contradiction between the actual data what usually engaged in analytic philosophy, and what should be – the subject of ethics. Since the person intertwined in life-world, lives now, its behavior is drawn from life-world's knowledge today. Consideration of the theory of communicative action through the prism of ethics does not require moral philosophy history draftas opposed to the theory of communicative society. Life-world "fluid" [6, p. 90]. It does not require infinite discussion of what should be, instead, leads to the analysis of reality here and now between us. And just this analysis, rather than hypothetical countless assumptions of future causes in some way behavior of individuals and achieving consensus.

Worth noted that for J. Habermas such an interpretation of life-world and its application to the philosophy of history, probably will not be effective, because in his book "Between facts and norms: contributions to a discourse the theory, law and democracy," he contrasts the structure of the social system to fluid and changing life-world. So it is worth mentioning that in this interpretation life-world enables inter-subjective and non-binding grasp of some experience with background knowledge. Obviously, the notion of culture and tradition, as it relates to content-symbolic part of life-world, is knowledge defined by the context, but we must remember that it depends on the background knowledge. Post-colonial societies are interesting from this perspective because, in fact, "social system" dictated history, tradition and cultural values. Specificity of background knowledge and such a feature as a direct probability made invisible undue influence of this system. Certainly, social system does not need to be excluded at all. Worth balance out one and other effects. But first, we believe, should be reach a mutual understanding in key issues of today, and then to investigate the history. Because it is our intersubjective recognition constitutes our understanding of the world.

Author's translation of the article

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