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DIALECTICS AS DIALOGUE AND METHOD: CRITERIA OF THE ESSENTIAL UNITY

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An attempt to overcome the existing in the sphere of literature scientific as well as academic (research) and educational literature of the opposition of dialectics, as a dialogue and dialectics as a method (cognition, thinking) is made in the article. An analytically-synthetic criterion, according to which each of the indicated characters of dialectics is a unity of both, hence, is a form of the analytically-synthetic activity is proposed for that purpose.

Keywords: dialectics, dialogue, method, thinking, analysis, synthesis, general, singular.

In the history of dialectics as a part of European philosophy clearly traced its two versions: as a dialogue (dialogic) and as a method (thinking, cognition). The first one, as we know, has emerged in ancient Greek philosophy, which is rightly considered to be founded by Socrates and Plato. The second one is associated with the German philosophy of Modern times, mainly with the philosophy of G. Hegel. The difference, at least outer, between these kinds is obvious. It served and still serves as the basis for their qualitative distinction, and often – for their opposition. This is due to the fact that the dialectics as a dialogue seems to be focused on the pluralism of thoughts, which is a manifestation of its anthropological content, and dialectics as a logical method (thinking, cognition) is monologic and therefore it “replicates” in its steady form.

In the history of philosophy the opposition between both kinds of dialectics observes, particularly, in the views of G. Hegel, L. Feuerbach, A. Schopenhauer, H.-G. Gadamer (it will be discussed later). And nowadays we can find opinions that mentioned types of dialectics, to put it simply, are not inclined to each other. In the peculiar form this opinion is expressed by Ukrainian philosopher Y. Ishchenko, who wrote: “As the experience of the XX century testifies, historical perspective observes not in Heraclitus’ doctrine of “war” and transition of opposites into each other (which served as a prototype for Hegelian and then for dogmatic Marxist-Leninist dialectics), which eventually turns into the universal indifference to any differences and oppositions, but in Socrates’ understanding of dialectics as dialogical method to find the truth. We can say that this model of dialectical thinking in its effort to justify and defend the one that claims to be the true position, tries to give an objective interpretation of possible or existing conceptual conflict, therefore we try to explain in the different “paradigms” of thinking the processes of changes, movement, development, failure or degradation in nature, society, and spiritual life of the human mind, or, for instance, to understand the meaning of Truth, Goodness, Good, etc.” [8, p. 237]

However, it should be noticed that in the works of Ukrainian as well as foreign philosophers can be found quite constructive thoughts on the necessity to see in these kinds of dialectics something in common (for instance, works by E. Ilyenkov "Philosophy and Culture", L. Ozadovska "The paradigm of dialogue in the modern thinking"). To be sure, here is a problem, what is evidenced by the relevance of the humanities' methodology problems, understanding the dialogue between cultures, civilizations and even the prospects of development of the dialectics as logic. Reflecting on matters of creative thinking's logic as intellectual dialogue V. Bibler avers that "Special perspectives rooted in the problem of "the logic of dialogue" for the development of dialectics, for solution and reformulation of many long overdue problems in dialectical logic" [1, p. 8]. Thus V. Bibler "...seems trying again, with historical, philosophical positions consider the question of the crucial role of the logic of dialogue in the development of creative thinking, especially in the development of theoretical creativity" [1, p. 8–9]. It can be easily noticed that in this case there is a contrast between dialogue and dialectics.

The purpose of the article – to prove the essential relationship between the dialectics as a dialogue and dialectics as a method (thinking, cognition) what will prevent their fundamental distinction and opposition. The author assumes that search for the new form of dialectics (which would correspond to the modern challenges that accompany the development of philosophy, science, social practices and human) should be based on understanding of the dialectics as something whole, despite the presence of specific historical images (which should be thought as a necessary elements of the whole). Following the logic of G. Hegel's considerations concerning the history of philosophy, it is worth to notice that the history of dialectics (despite the apparent difference of its sequentially changing images) is the same dialectics but at different stages of its development, and that peculiar to each of these stages basic principle is only a branching of the whole, the foundation of which is the principle of "opposition".

So what content is originally (historically) fits into the concept of "dialectics"? It is believed that mentioned concept was proposed in the sphere of philosophy by Zeno of Elea. However, we cannot be sure about this statement certainty. According to this Diogenes Laertius writes: "They say that Zeno the Eleatic was the first to write dialogues. But, according to Favorinus in his "Memorabilia", Aristotle in the first book of his dialogue "On Poets" asserts that it was Alexamenus of Styra or Teos. In my opinion, Plato who brought this form of writing to perfection, ought to be adjudged the prize for its invention as well as for its embellishment" [6, p. 164]. The term dialectics was understood as a skill (art) to conduct a dialogue, discussion, debate to achieve the truth (it derives from its content – the Greek "dialektih"). Nevertheless, dialectics as a dialogue is not just talk or a quarrel in the everyday sense, but the art to dialogue through the questions and answers, despite the severity of relations between the interlocutors what happened quite often. In this regard, Plato, similarly to Socrates and Heraclitus, rightly stated: "And the one who knows how to ask questions and give answers, we call dialectic" [12, p. 425].

However, the ability to ask questions and give answers is not indicative of its designation as a dialectics. Namely, dialogue and dialectics are not the same. Note that Plato's dialogue has different types – tutorial and investigative, the first one has theoretical and practical orientation, the second one – is as for exercises as well as for competition. Still in all these cases, the art of evidence is made dialectically. "A dialogue – as Diogenes Laertius mentions – is a discourse consisting of question and answer on some philosophical or political subject, with due regard to the characters of the persons introduced and the choice of diction. Dialectic is the art of discourse by

which we either refute or establish some proposition by means of question and answer on the part of the interlocutors” [6, p. 164]. In this regard, the dialectics as a dialogue already appears in the definition of the art of maieutics (the Greek for “obstetrics art”). Socrates as one of the dialectics’ founders and the character of Plato’s dialogues followed the position that he helped to birth the truth in the minds of others through the clash of opposite views. According to L. Ozadovska “the dialogue that takes place between two consciousnesses in the form of questioning on conditions of equality that gives the mind an opportunity to discover the truth, which he had not even suspected before the dialogue. Maieutics helps the interlocutor to discover the way of finding the truth by revealing the contradictions in ones reasoning. There fore Socratic dialogue is a kind of intellectual struggle, which results in the elimination of inconsistent and conflicting opinions” [11, p. 12].

As we know, Socrates did not write papers, did not give his audience any truth in finished form. He was convinced that the mind of any person is able to generate the truth, thus he just helped his students to reach it independently. The main method for this purpose that Socrates chose was dialectical one, which he liked to compare to craft of his mother – midwife Fenareta. This method consisted of partial abstraction and focus on general, of the elevation of partial representations, cases and examples to the level of concepts, and this method led to the logical definitions of concepts, and, inversely, to the distribution of knowable things for kinship and species in accordance with these concepts.

According to the sources, among all of Socrates’ students only Plato learned his teachings authentically. The most important points of his doctrine Plato gave in those dialogues in which Socrates appears as a main character. However, Plato not only adequately learned and applied the philosophy of his teacher, but also extended and complemented it. So what complement and development did Plato make in Socrates’ philosophy (as dialectics)? A talk with someone (in a purpose to find the truth with the one who had this inclination) Socrates usually started with the pretending that he finds his interlocutor a knowing person, but then with the help of number of ingenious questions he made him to admit that his knowledge is or insufficient or absent at all. Such an exposing of ignorance is the so-called Socratic *irony*. It led to the realization of ignorance; but this awareness was not the final goal to Socrates, in fact, he understood it as the beginning of the true wisdom. Awareness of ignorance should awake the desire for the true knowledge and encourage the search. Socrates’ direct and positive mission, on his mind, was to help others to achieve this knowledge. What about Plato’s dialectics G. Hegel, for instance, insists that “its purpose is to study things in their own being and movement and thus to demonstrate the finitude of the partial categories of understanding” and that “among the ancients Plato is termed the inventor of Dialectic; and his right to the name rests on the fact that the Platonic philosophy first gave the free scientific, and thus at the same time the objective, form to Dialectic. Socrates, as we should expect from the general character of his philosophizing, has the dialectical element in a predominantly subjective shape, that of Irony. He used to turn Dialectic, first against ordinary consciousness, and then especially against the Sophists. In his conversations he used to simulate the wish for some clearer knowledge about the subject under discussion, and after putting all sorts of questions with that intent, he drew those with whom he conversed to the opposite of what their first impressions had pronounced correct. If, for instance, the Sophists claimed to be teachers, Socrates by a series of questions forced the Sophist Protagoras to confess that all learning is only recollection. In his more strictly scientific dialogues, Plato employs the dialectical method to show the finitude of all hard and fast terms of understanding. Thus in the “Parmenides” he deduces

the many from the one. In this grand style did Plato treat Dialectic” [5, p. 207]. G. Hegel sees in Plato’s Socratic dialogues that dialectics of thinking which he developed in his “The Science of Logic” (the transition and reflection of concepts).

Thus, with G. Hegel, in fact with his predecessors I. Kant, J. Fichte, F. Schelling the dialectics appears as a logical system and as a method of philosophical thinking. The feature of philosophical systems of mentioned German philosophers is that these ones are built on the basis of dialectical thinking (with the exception of I. Kant). Nevertheless, even here it is stored the analytically synthetic thinking activity that was present in Plato’s dialogue. For example, the movement of the definitions in J. Fichte’s system of “the science of knowledge” realizes as a logical form (triad): thesis – antithesis – synthesis. Of course, the dialectics in its logical form (the system of principles that is presented as the relation of logical categories) is a qualitatively new kind of its development. Dialogical thinking of Antiquity was assimilated in the systematically built theory. According to this, the participants of the dialogue (the conflicting ones) had to find objective foundations, namely the basis of the contradictions that were subjectively admitted by the participants of the dialogue. However, evolving in this manner dialectics begins to appear not as a living dialogue, but as a theory, a complex of principles (a method) of construction the system of philosophical (scientific) knowledge, what purpose is to explain the changing objective world, that develop from its inherent contradictions. Such difference between mentioned dialectics’ varieties led philosophers to their abstract opposition, moreover, to the attempt to identify humanistic content only in dialogical dialectics.

Indicative in this regard is position of L. Feuerbach, who attended G. Hegel’s lectures on logic and definitely knew his dialectics. However, he suggests the idea to restore the dialectics as a dialogue: “The true dialectic – philosopher proclaims – is not a monologue of the solitary thinker with himself. It is a dialogue between “I” and “You”” [14, p. 203]. Noteworthy that the idea of such dialectics was suggested by L. Feuerbach within the proclaimed by him “philosophy of the future” – the anthropological materialism. “The new philosophy – L. Feuerbach mentions – makes man, together with nature as the basis of man, the exclusive, universal, and highest object of philosophy; it makes anthropology, together with physiology, the universal science” [14, p. 202]. German philosopher repeatedly underlined that the truth is not in the thinking, not in the knowledge as such, but in the fullness of human life. Obviously, we must agree with Y. Kushakov that “dialectics of L. Feuerbach – historically determined form of dialectics, which should not be confused with either the next or previous its forms, and it has not only historical, but also actual sense. L. Feuerbach’s dialectics is not the Hegelian logical dialectics, not the antinomic dialectics of I. Kant and not F. Schelling’s aesthetic dialectics, but relatively independent form of dialectics – the dialogic dialectics” [10, p. 386]. However, and this should be admitted, dialectics as a dialogue in a systematic form was not created by L. Feuerbach, or rather, he did not develop the dialogic philosophizing in dialectical (contradictory) way for all the problems that he deliberately set. And this despite the fact that L. Feuerbach emphasized – human nature is available only in communication, in the unity of man and man, which is based on the reality of the differences between I and You.

Criticizing G. Hegel for his idealism, L. Feuerbach meanwhile did not accept his dialectical method. Nevertheless, to be fair, it must be admitted – in his philosophy was another (except dialogue) dialectics and he defined it as a method. Its main points are antithetic, that is contradiction of the opposites (God is the alienation of man), reduction (supernatural to man), genetically critical

analysis, that is traceability as one opposition grows out of another (man's idea of God). With this in mind, M. Bulatov concludes: "Thus, antithetic, reduction, genetic analysis – the parts or components of Feuerbach's method, which (method) can be called dialectical or antithetical, as it deals with the totality of all polar categories of philosophy and theology, with their opposition and with method of reduction, since the purpose of L. Feuerbach's life and work was contradiction of theology and anthropology, the reduction the first one to the second. An essential feature of the method is deliberated and systematic usage of certain techniques of thinking. For the German thinker those are antithetic, reduction, genetically critical analysis. Therefore, we are not dealing with the sporadic operations, but with actual philosophical method that differs him from his predecessors and from subsequent figures in the history of thought" [2, p. 523].

In the context of the theme, it is worth to represent in details the views of the German philosopher, representative of the philosophy of life and besides contemporary of J. Fichte, F. Schelling and G. Hegel, A. Schopenhauer. Particularly, well-known Polish historian of philosophy W. Tatarkiewicz said: "...such a short formulation, which A. Schopenhauer used to name his great work, the world is "will and representation". The inner essence of the world is will, which appears outside as a representation. This was a significant difference between A. Schopenhauer and idealists like G. Hegel: unlike them, the foundation of the world he considered as irrational. Accordingly, A. Schopenhauer had to use another method in philosophy: not dialectics and not the experience (because external expertise gives knowledge only about phenomena), but the direct introspection" [13, p. 275].

However, A. Schopenhauer expresses the ideas about the problem of the method in general. His position is to ensure that it is impossible in philosophy firstly to create a method of philosophizing, and then do this philosophizing, namely, to use the method. "If a philosopher – A. Schopenhauer emphasizes, – started to invent the method wherewith he is going to philosophize, he would resemble to the poet, who at first invented the aesthetics, and then would create, being guided by it. Both of them would be like the person who at first sang a song and then dancing to the song. Thinking spirit has to find his way starting with the primary motivation: the rule and its application, method and execution, as the matter and form, must be inseparable. Only when the target has been achieved, we can look back on the traversed path. Aesthetics and methodology by theirs nature are younger than poetry and philosophy, as well as grammar is younger than language, general bass is younger than music, and logic is younger than thinking" [15, p. 180]. Such A. Schopenhauer's position regarding the method and its application is true. However, it also does not mean that the method in its purity abstracted from the content of philosophizing cannot be then consciously applied to the new objects of philosophizing. Finally, A. Schopenhauer did not avoid the issue of logic and dialectics. However, there is only one logic for him – formal one, and dialectics – exist just as an art to dispute and have a conversation. "The logic, dialectics and rhetoric – he says, – form a whole, because these collectively constitute the technique of the mind. Under this name, these should be taught together – the logic as a technique of its own thinking, the dialectics as a technique to keep the dispute with the others and rhetoric as a technique of language facing the many, accordingly to the single, dual and plural, and monologue, dialogue and eulogy. I understand dialectics, following the Aristotle (*Metaph, III, 2, It Analyt, post. I, 11*), as the art of conversation, the target of which is collective search for the truth, the philosophical truth. However, this discussion inevitably leads to some differences, that is why dialectics can be defined as the art of dispute. Examples and models of dialectics we can find in Plato's dialogues,

but in fact for the theory of it, namely for the technique of dispute – a heuristics is still done very little” [15, p. 151]. As we can see, A. Schopenhauer does not combine logic and dialectics, and does not consider the dialectics as a method of thinking in philosophy, albeit the experience of such combination was present in the philosophy of I. Kant, J. Fichte, F. Schelling and G. Hegel.

The second example in the context of the assessment of dialectics as a method and as a dialogue regards, in particular, the position of German philosopher, a leading representative of hermeneutics of the XX century – H.-G. Gadamer. It is known, that the concept of dialogue was quite frequently used in hermeneutics. According to H.-G. Gadamer the target of understanding is not in the original interpretation of the text and not in a simple reconstruction of the author’s views, but in the activation of thinking processes through the formation of the system due to the dialogue. This is a dialogical communication (dialogical cooperation) between the text and interpreter, author and interpreter in order to avoid one-sided influence and one-sided interpretation, whereas the true meaning is acquired through “the conflict of existing worldviews”. The general H.-G. Gadamer’s attitude to the notion of method is the following: “Initially hermeneutical phenomenon in general is not a problem of method. It refers not to the method of understanding, which would make the texts the object of scientific knowledge, like all other objects of experience. Primarily it refers not even to the construction of any system of firmly grounded knowledge, what corresponds to the methodological ideal of science – and yet it refers to the cognition and the truth” [3, p. 38]. H.-G. Gadamer unlike A. Schopenhauer in terms of dialectics «deals» not with I. Kant, J. Fichte and F. Schelling, but only with G. Hegel. At the same time, of course, the subject of his meditations is dialectics of Plato. Nevertheless, he prefers Plato’s dialogical dialectics to the logical dialectics of G. Hegel. He notes: “In any case, my intention was to combine the scale of philosophical hermeneutics with the Platonic dialectics, and not with Hegelian” [3, p. 623]. The reason for such approximation to the ancient dialectics H.-G. Gadamer saw in absence in it the features of the method, which G. Hegel described as a “dialectical construction of totality”, so that “the essence of hermeneutic experience was lost, as well as the radical finality, which is the basis of it”.

It must be emphasized that H.-G. Gadamer did not refuse the dialectics and in every way linked it with the hermeneutic phenomenon. In addition, here are a number of philosopher’s opinions about this. First of all: “Now the hermeneutical experience that we are endeavoring to think from the viewpoint of language as medium is certainly not an experience of thinking in the same sense as this dialectic of the concept, which seeks to free itself entirely from the power of language. Nevertheless, there is something resembling dialectic in hermeneutical experience: an activity of the thing itself, an action that, unlike the methodology of modern science, is a passion, an understanding, an event that happens to one” [3, p. 537]. Secondly: “The hermeneutical experience also has its own rigor: that of uninterrupted listening. A thing does not present itself to the hermeneutical experience without an effort special to it, namely that of “being negative toward itself”. A person who is trying to understand a text has to keep something at a distance – namely everything that suggests itself, on the basis of his own prejudices, as the meaning expected – as soon as it is rejected by the sense of the text itself. Even the experience of reversal (which happens unceasingly in talking, and which is the real experience of dialectic) has its equivalent here. Explicating the whole of meaning towards which understanding is directed forces us to make interpretive conjectures and to take them back again. The self-cancellation of the interpretation makes it possible for the thing itself – the meaning of the text – to assert itself. The movement of

the interpretation is dialectical not primarily because the one-sidedness of every statement can be balanced by another side – this is, as we shall see, a secondary phenomenon in interpretation – but because the word that interpretatively fits the meaning of the text expresses the whole of this meaning – i.e., allows an infinity of meaning to be represented within it in a finite way. That this is dialectic, conceived on the basis of the medium of language, needs more exact discussion, as does the way in which this dialectic differs from the metaphysical dialectic of Plato and Hegel” [3, p. 537–538]. Thirdly: “Since hermeneutic experience implies an event of language that corresponds to dialectical presentation in Hegel, it too partakes of dialectic – namely the dialectic, elaborated above [...], of question and answer” [3, p. 544].

Thus, according to A. Schopenhauer and H.-G. Gadamer obviously traced an attempt to oppose, using H.-G. Gadamer’s terminology, “metaphysical”, “methodical” dialectics to dialogical one. Of course, this opposition has the real reasons, but we should keep in mind, that in both cases we still talk about the same – the dialectics. Hence, in these images of dialectics there is something invariant, which combining them and is their nature. What is it?

In the context of Plato’s Socratic dialogues it is clearly seen analytically (separating) – synthetic (generalizing) essence of dialectics as maieutics. It is again about a dual path of dialectical process of concepts’ definitions: the separation of the whole to the parts and vice versa combination of the multiplicity into the whole. Moreover, the beginning (the whole) in the reverse movement from the multiplicity do not restored literally, but only by the form, and that is a spiral. Displayed analytically-synthetic nature is inherent to the logical method of thinking, which was defined by G. Hegel in following: «This no less synthetic than analytic moment of the judgment through which the initial universal determines itself from within itself as the other of itself is to be called the dialectical moment. Dialectic is one of those ancient sciences that have been the most misjudged in the metaphysics of the moderns and in general also by popular philosophy, both ancient and recent. Diogenes Laertius said of Plato that, just as Thales was the founder of natural philosophy and Socrates of moral philosophy, so Plato was the founder of the third of the sciences that belong to philosophy, of dialectic – a contribution for which he was highly esteemed by the ancients but that often goes quite unnoticed by those who have the most to say about him. Dialectic has often been regarded as an art, as if it rested on a subjective talent and did not belong to the objectivity of the concept” [4, p. 296]. In addition, that universal and comprehensive flexibility of concepts that comes to the identity of opposites in G. Hegel’s logic is nothing but a Socratic dialectics of a dispute, which is present in the dialogues of Plato and which produced in G. Hegel the illusion of purely spontaneous activity of the mind. Plato’s dialogic is reflected not just within the Hegelian dialectics, but conversely.

“Eventually – L. Ozadovska notes, – the term “dialectics” has two basic meanings: 1. dialectics as a logical method that leads to the knowledge of being by splitting into the opposites; 2. dialectics as dialogic, namely as some form, as the art of conversation, the purpose of which is the truth. The most complete and organic combination of these definitions of dialectics in Ancient Greek philosophy we find in Plato’s “Dialogues”. Philosopher says that dialectics is the science of all sciences, because it exists not in understanding of the principles of science, not “in the request and providing the meaning” of sensual things, but this is achieved by the structural representation of the whole as the whole-separating multiplicity. Dialectics, according to Plato, is discursive and intuitive, so that it can simultaneously separate the single into the parts and discover general in varieties of its manifestations” [11, p. 12]. Pretty convincing are L. Ozadovska’s thoughts of

the relationship between the dialogue and dialectics as a method in its Hegelian form, namely within the philosophy of G. Hegel. Firstly: "Creating philosophical systems aimed at the unity and uniqueness of concept, contrary to the dialectical thinking. However, to eliminate dialogism of such complex philosophical systems as Hegel's and Kant's was impossible. Idea of antinomies in "pure reason" in Kant's philosophy and Hegelian thought that truth is a process of mutual inhibition of the opposites includes dialogism in a latent form, but the interpretation of these ideas takes place according to monologic tradition. Perhaps this fact is the reason that the term "dialectics" since modern times assigned its basic definition as a method of cognition of reality, albeit different philosophers have different definitions of its nature and capabilities" [11, p. 14-15]. Secondly: "In Hegel's philosophy by dialectics understood the only true method of cognition of reality, which is opposite to metaphysics and established in the modern philosophy. Thus the Hegelian triad in form "thesis – antithesis – synthesis", which is the basis of the dialectical principle of development, is quite similar to the form of dialogue, in which in the relation "I – You" one of the characters advocates one thought and the second one – the opposite, and the result of dialogue is some consensus or synthesis. But this similarity is the similarity only by form, because the subject of Hegel's triad development is the absolute idea, or absolute spirit – monologic in its perfection, impersonal mind which gives a birth to the material world and a human mind, in which it is embodied. Therefore, Hegel's thesis and antithesis are not autonomous, independent positions of different actors who seek to understand the truth, but only the moments, components of the objective being and thinking of one man on his way to the absolute truth" [11, p. 15].

Hence, dialogical dialectics as well as dialectics as a method of logical thinking and cognition by its nature is the same dialectics. The only difference is that the first one (dialogical) expresses the position of independent but different subjects, aspiring to the truth through dialectic conversation, and the second one (monologic) is the thinking of one person (the thinker) who also seeks the truth. Dialogical dialectics – a search for the truth in conversations with anyone who had such inclination, while the dialectics, for example G. Hegel's, is the attribute of a single reason, therefore it is the attribute of more general form. In this context certainly should be emphasized quite original for expression of connectedness between dialogic and Hegelian "metaphysical" dialectics the idea of mentioned above H.-G. Gadamer: "The primacy of dialogue, the relation of question and answer, can be seen in even so extreme a case as that of Hegel's dialectic as a philosophical method. To elaborate the totality of the determinations of thought, which was the aim of Hegel's logic, is as it were the attempt to comprehend within the great monologue of modern «method» the continuum of meaning that is realized in every particular instance of dialogue. When Hegel sets himself the task of making the abstract determinations of thought fluid and subtle, this means dissolving and remolding logic into concrete language, and transforming the concept into the meaningful power of the word that questions and answers – a magnificent reminder, even if unsuccessful, of what dialectic really was and is. Hegel's dialectic is a monologue of thinking that tries to carry out in advance what matures little by little in every genuine dialogue" [3, p. 434]. Further, if we assume that feature of the dialogue is intellectual struggle of its members, than it naturally cannot be outside thinking. Therefore, logical operations of dismemberment and linking the concepts that occur based on questions and answers, is nothing else but the method (dialectical) of thinking. Accordingly, the "method" is the concept not only inherent to dialectics as a logic, but also unite the latest and dialogic. And when it comes to the dialectics of Socrates, it refers to this peculiar to the thinker method of presenting his thoughts in the dialogue (dispute). The dialectical method (taken

in the most general sense) is the way to solve the problems inherent in a number of categorical relationships, which philosophy studied throughout its history. In this case, it is the unifying basis of the occurrence and explanation the pre-Socratic natural philosophy, Heraclitus' idea of becoming, Zeno's paradoxes, Socratic' maieutics, Plato's doctrine of the world of ideas. And this unifying base may be specified, particularly, due to the invariant category of «opposition». But it is invariant also for all the next images of dialectics. Furthermore, within the dialogue L. Ozadovska discovers the implementation of some basic features of Hegel's logically-dialectical method and she notes: "Thus, the dialogue – a breakthrough in the world of other relationships where each of the participants in the dialogue changes himself and the Other. The relation of the dialogue is always a relation of qualitatively different personalities, which are able to perceive the "Other" as a self-sufficient person. Entering into a dialogue "I" must "remove" (according to G. Hegel) his own qualitative being as individual. But this "abolition" does not destroy the phenomenon, and (again, according to G. Hegel) subjected it to negation. Then, in the same process of dialogue the same process of "abolition" of ones own "I" provides another participant of the dialogue, so that each of them plays the "Other" [11, p. 26]. To this also could be added that each participant of the dialogue "abolishing" himself (his qualitative being) not only plays the "Other", but reproduces (restores) himself in the "Other" that is returns to himself.

But the combination of the two kinds of dialectics is possible and for the other reason, about which P. Kopnin says: "Dialectics from antiquity times acquired two different forms: the art of operating the concepts (Plato) and theoretical understanding of the reality, especially nature (Heraclitus). These two beginnings in the dialectics conceived quite heterogeneous: or the dialectics teaches to think (the art of operating the concepts), or provides the understanding, interpretation of the world, the essence of its things. These two systems of knowledge for a long time were opposed to one another as logical to ontological. However, eventually the development of philosophy led to the idea of their coincidence. Dialectics among other its tasks should also aim to create and improve the device for scientific and theoretical thinking, which leads to objective truth. But this device is a system of concepts, the meaning of which is taken from the objective world" [9, p. 71]. Accordingly, the achieving the truth (and its search) is based on the contradistinction of opinions, it should be noted that it is not only a philosophical dialogue specificity but also a method of solution the scientific problems. Assuming that in the process of dialogical organized thinking (based on the ability to detect inconsistencies in the thinking of interlocutor) division of concepts and their binding is the subjective dialectics (as sensual things appear already in the form of the concepts of Others), the same separation and binding takes place in the process of investigation of the real object (the objective dialectics). "Dialectics, therefore, is the ability to detect the contradiction in the definition of the object, and then find the solution of this contradiction by showing how detected conflict is "fading" in the highest kind, or, inversely, as the highest kind is split into the opposites which are contained in it" [7, p. 82].

It is appropriate to recall that the dialogue as the way to communicate finds its broad definition in various spheres of life of modern man. In particular, it is stable factor in philosophy, politics, and science. It is even a dialogue of civilizations, cultures and so on. Related to this aspect is the concept of discourse (from Lat. *discursus*) denoting a conversation, dialogue. Discourse with its different meanings (logical thinking, verbal communication or verbal practice) is also undergoing a wide productive distribution in various sectors of the spiritual life (in the arts, science, philosophy). Singled out as a specific politically-ideological discourse, the feature of which

causes the necessity of using the ideas of communicative philosophy and communicative ethics (K.-O. Apel, J. Habermas). In this case, there is a transition of the dialogue into the polilogue. As a way of philosophizing, the dialogue takes different thematic focuses and the roots of such expansion of dialogical communication should seek out in the democratic, pluralistic society principles (let us remember the ancient Athenian democracy). However, it does not indicate that the dialogue in its actual sense has always and everywhere the necessarily dialectical nature, and that in its context recognizes dialectics in general.

Overall, dialectics as a holistic phenomenon in essence appears identical in its form of dialogue and in the form of logical method (cognition, thinking). The difference depends only on the development needs of the philosophical, scientific, human and social factors, one of which at some point may actualize one of its (the dialectics) kind (image, form).

Author's translation of the article

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