ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN TRUTH AND FALSITY

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Plato's theory of reminiscence provides us with some clues on the nature of knowledge. It is seen as quite elusive, and it evokes a need for questioning the notion of truth as a whole, which constitutes the **scientific novelty** of the research. There is no proof which gives us the right to assert that we possess any reliable knowledge, and this is why **aiming** at investigating the notion and foundation of the concept of knowledge is directed at clarifying what exactly the knowledge consists of. The most important theories of truth are analyzed and taken to account in order to assess the boundaries between the two opposites. The article mainly uses **methods** of historical chronological and comparative analysis If truth's being truth is to depend on the total absence of falsity, their borders are to be taken as clearly distinct. But this requires more precise insight into broader problems, linked to the issue. This topic is being discussed in the context of a broad perception of the Universe. Theories of modern and post-modern thinkers are taken as an inheritance of Plato's statements. Certain approaches to the perception of the Universe are considered in order to develop an acceptable view of boundaries between truth and falsity. Cognizance and deception are assessed in order to specify the distinction between two opposites. The total absence of falsity is required for belief's being knowledge, ant this is why most beliefs can cease to be knowledge at all. In **conclusions**, the phenomenon of brainwashing is analyzed as a result of the study. Plato's theory of reminiscence can be proved neither by experience, nor by five basic senses, the boundaries between truth and falsity are elusive and cannot be distinctly set by any scientific method available today. It is difficult to do this, since being humans, we are highly biased. It is apparent on the example of Russian propaganda, which performs brainwashing on a global scale aiming at achieving its dominance. It prevents those susceptible to it from being able to exercise their own will as well as free choice.

Key words: truth, falsity, brainwashing, deception, boundaries.

Introduction. Despite the fact that the theory of reminiscence itself at first glimpse seems to be pretty vague to some extent, as well as it can be neither proved nor supported by any experiment, this theory is significantly profound in terms of modern theories of language. This can be extrapolated to the question on the nature of knowledge, e.g. when we know something but are not quite sure whether the known fact is true or false since belief can be false as well, as it was shown earlier [1]. These statements settle the question of truth and falsity, as well as on the borders between these two opposites.

This article is aimed to throw some light on clarification of the boundaries between truth and falsity. There is always some paradox being relied upon, at least implicitly, as we form conclusions, which makes the latter to some extent illogical. Consideration of borders between truth and falsity might require discussing several paradoxes. Since the nature of knowledge appears to be quite elusive, it provides us with the need for questioning the notion of truth. Consequently, if truth's being truth is to depend on the total absence of falsity, their borders are

to be taken as clearly distinct. Still, this requires more precise insight into broader problems, linked to the issue.

The problem of perception of the Universe is being discussed widely by scholars [2], but apparently there is a distinction between so-called "our Universe", or the one we observe, and the one which is outside of us. While assessing the correctness of names as images of things, Plato in his "Cratylus" (432c) asserts that an image cannot represent a thing in its full perfectness, as well as in the opposite case there would be "two Cratyluses" instead of the only one. The assertion concludes that correctness does not presuppose identical likeness of a thing and an image. Plato continues: "Do you not perceive how far images are from possessing the same qualities as the originals which they imitate?" [3]. Presumably, this is what much later Immanuel Kant meant by distinguishing between noumena and phenomena, and this is why he claimed that cognizance of a thing was impossible, but this topic is to be discussed elsewhere.

Learning as a core principle of human's existence. Basic principles of cognizance of the Universe due to their elusiveness cannot steer clear of some kind of paradoxes. A series of aporia developed by Zeno puzzled not only Aristotle, but all upcoming generations of thinkers. It contributed significantly to the development of a variety of theories and approaches to different issues. The further development of problem of knowledge to some extent involves so-called "twofold ignorance", which questions what exactly can be called "knowledge", and what does not belong to it while still leading to the positive result.

The fundamental problem linked to the process of learning, which is a core principle of human's existence, is the notion of truth. Language, being a means of cognizance of the Universe, resembles the progress from less to more perfect, although Zeno's paradoxes reveal to us paradoxical nature of language and point at inherent inconsistencies in the process of understanding of reality. The phenomenon of language does not possess clear and explainable nature, since behavioristic theories fail to explain it sufficiently [4]. The standard epistemological objection to these theories is that it possesses to some extent paradoxical nature we are unable to explain by any of methods available [5]. As a result, this view adds significantly to the development and improvement of newer approaches to the process of learning in general and obtaining reliable knowledge in particular. Epistemologists have been working for quite long time towards what they hope is going to be a non-skeptical conception of knowledge [6].

There is no proof which gives us the right to assert that we possess any reliable knowledge, and this is why aiming at investigating the notion and foundation of the concept of knowledge is directed at clarifying what exactly the knowledge consists of. First, according to Plato, it is impossible to learn anything at all if we lack knowledge about ourselves, and in this article the attempt has been made to assess the boundaries between truth and falsity in terms of their application to the reality. But again, the reality can be seen differently, as it was shown in the previous article, and this is why the relation between truth and falsity is to be assessed more precisely.

Knowledge is usually identified as justified true belief, or JTB, as it can be inferred from Plato's "Meno" and other dialogues [7]. As a rule, JTB is a point for scholars to start investigating the concept of knowledge, which was primarily initiated by Plato. The majority of modern theories differentiate between knowledge and belief [8, 157–170], and this is the riddle posed by Socrates at the end of his "Meno". As usually, Socrates provides somewhat enigmatic and elusive distinction between knowledge and true belief, since Plato never provides explicit answers in his dialogues. It is convenient for distinction to be generalized into a more wide-ranging concept of truth. The difficulty in defining the notion cannot be confined to Plato's theory exclusively, as well as it still remains problematic [9, 221–240]. The elusiveness of the concept of knowledge generates challenges to the philosophical tradition. This is why the definition of knowledge

of a proposition as justified true belief in some contexts is not sees as a sufficient one. The problems arise in cases of either actual or possible situations in which someone has a belief which is both true and well supported by evidence. As it is believed by many epistemologists, it fails to be knowledge. The extensive debate was initiated with a single two-and-a-half-page article [10]. Gettier's article triggered a period of pronounced and renovated epistemological debates and innovations which can be applied to the definition of truth.

The majority of epistemologists are referring to propositional knowledge [11] which is knowledge of a truth or known fact, or knowledge of how the world is constructed in any respect, which is described by a given occurrence. But again, following the words of Plato, if we do not fully understand ourselves, we will not be able to fully understand what it is either. In case if JTB is false, it is evidently that it should be replaced with something else. Unfortunately, Gettier himself made no suggestions about any replacement, which resembles Plato's style of dialogues. But philosophy always settles questions, while other sciences aim to look for answers [12, 238]. It is evident that JTB form of analysis of knowledge presupposes three individually necessary and sufficient conditions for certain knowledge. For instance, to obtain knowledge that you are a living being, three prerequisites are required, namely: 1) you have to believe in this; 2) the belief is supposed to be true; 3) it is supposed to be based on good or sufficient evidence. The biggest problem, as it can be inferred from previous articles in this series, can be encountered in the last statement, since Zeno would not consider experience-based evidence of Achilles being faster than tortoise as a valid rejection to his aporia. This way of thinking questions the truth of the primary proposition.

However, imagine that someone, who is looking at the farm, sees something what seems to be a horse. Consequently, the only belief which instantly occurs to someone, who is looking at the farm, is that there is a horse at the farm. Coincidentally, he is right, because there is a horse in the far end of the field behind the hill, but it cannot be seen, and the only animal which can be seen is a bull which looks like a horse. So, there is no direct evidence of presence of the horse in this very field, although the statement has been made correctly, and belief is true and justified, since someone, who is looking at the farm, trusts his eyes. But such JTB cannot be considered valid knowledge [13]. With this quite simplified example it would be interesting to consider what astronomers are able to see while looking into the telescope. Their beliefs, while being true, are supposed to be supported by something else in order to become valid knowledge.

Knowledge versus ignorance. Experiments, which are aimed at proving similar beliefs as well as at avoiding justifications that are present within each and every case to be false, can go wrong due to infinite series of unpredictable circumstances and hindrances. As a result, it can be inferred from this that the justification indicates only the fact that the belief is true to some extent, but it does not prove conclusively that it is true absolutely. This is how justification still leaves open at least the possibility that the belief is false. This is what Plato speaks about in his "Meno" providing us with an example of Dedalus' effigies (Meno 97e). Plato questions whether such knowledge possesses required validity to be compared to the higher type in order to be called valid knowledge.

But such cases can contain a good portion of luck which makes it impossible to prove that they cannot be called knowledge. In fact, this is most distinctive of Gettier cases. Consider, for example, the case with Columbus' enterprise. Despite the fact that he was ignorant of existence of two Americas, he was to some extent knowledgeable of the spherical shape of the Earth. But not only this: he appeared to be extremely lucky to complete his four round-trips. Consequently, despite of Columbus' ignorance, the outcome was immense and it is highly questionable whether the falsity his ignorance comprised can be equated to falsity of flat shape of Earth or not. It can be concluded that there exists certain degree of falsity which contributes to falsity's being either less

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false, or more inclined to truth. It appears that when certain abnormal or favorable circumstance is present in this or that case, this circumstance can make quite fortuitous the existence of justified and true belief despite the fact that it is not supported by strong evidence. This, in its own turn, blurs the boundaries between the two opposites, i.e. truth and falsity.

Communication is provided mostly via the means of language, and the relation between truth and meaning is to be assessed as the place where truth and language relate closely. Insofar as the theory of meaning is notoriously broad [14, 153–174], some scholars use theory of truth as part of theory of meaning [15]. The first sort of theory of meaning, or semantic theory, is a theory which assigns semantic contents to expressions of a language. The second sort of theory of meaning, a foundational theory, is a theory which states the facts in virtue of which expressions have the semantic contents that they have [16]. Some expressions might be context-sensitive, or indexical. Within a propositional semantics, we can say that certain expressions possess different contents relative to distinct contexts. But the phenomenon of context-sensitivity is one which any semantic theory recognizes. This is why many philosophers and linguists think that one or more of these categories of expressions are indexicals [17, 28–42]. As it can be observed, virtually every natural language expression is context-sensitive, which gives a good soil for deception.

The theory of truth conditions can be applied to the theory of meaning. This category of research is pretty broad and there are different approaches to it. It would be expedient to look at what Plato says in this context in "Cratylus" (436 b): "Do you not see that he who in his inquiry after things follows names and examines into the meaning of each one runs great risks of being deceived?" More than twenty centuries later, L. Wittgenstein expressed the idea that humans do not communicate via words, but via images [18, 409–443]. This view was widely accepted and lively discussed in broad academic circles and contributed significantly to the development of science. Not actually being a follower of Plato, Wittgenstein initiated the process of studying language through the perspective of other disciplines [19], and this subject was discussed earlier [20]. But images can be distorted due to differences in perception, and this poses significant thread to their truthfulness or correctness, as it is said in the aforementioned quotation of Plato's "Cratylus". Again, Bertrand Russel claimed that false propositions pose a problem, but he was far from the first one who pointed at this controversy. Consequently, there has been an extensive debate among epistemologists on the definition of truth [21].

One of the most significant approaches to the definition of truth is so-called correspondence theory which is concerned with the relation between propositions and the world. It presupposes that proposition is true when the world contains a fact that is structurally similar to the proposition [22]. Again, this has not been noticed for the first time, since Aristotle had spoken about it quite long time ago in his "Metaphysics" (Γ 7.27): "to say of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true" [23]. The basic idea of correspondence was captured in this quotation, as some scholars suggest [24, 341–375]. This Aristotle's saying was refined and clarified more extensively later, and correspondence relation is explicated as a representation relation, since a truth bearer is called true if it represents a fact [25]. But this theory only exacerbated further discussions on the subject, since there is an ambiguity on what can be called a fact. Reliance of truth on belief is a key point of Joachim's theory, which claims that any belief is true if and only if it is part of a coherent system of beliefs. But any system which seems to be coherent today, can be questioned sometime later. More pragmatical point is expressed by Peirce, as well as he is usually understood as holding the view that truth is the end of inquiry, or truth is something which is satisfactory to believe [21]. It is not entirely clear what scholars mean by suggested definitions, partially due to the complicacy of the subject as well as due to its elusiveness. Probably due to this elusiveness Tarski's definition of "semantic conception of truth" [24] lacks precise explanation, following to a certain degree Plato's approach. It is not entirely clear what exactly Tarski had

in mind by defining this conception, but it can be assumed that Tarski's theory defines truth for sentences in terms of concepts like reference and satisfaction. They are intimately related to the basic semantic functions of names and predicates. Primarily, Tarski was concerned with so-called "liar paradox" that it would make theories in languages containing a truth predicate inconsistent [25, 695–717]. This was especially important to his own correspondence theory, but whether it provides any substantial philosophical account of truth at all or not, is still a matter of controversy.

Paradoxical nature of truth. The so-called "Epimenides paradox" has created enormous number of debates, discussions and articles since it was introduced. Some scholars argue that this paradox shows, among other issues, essential "incompleteness" of the world [26], at least to some, though uncertain, degree. Some assert that the paradox shows the importance of context in language [15], and this assertion seems to resemble Aristotle's principle of noncontradiction. But what is the most intriguing, it is that liar paradox shows that the notion of truth is a vague notion [27]. This can be taken as evidence (of which has been said earlier) that truth is far from being a fully objective matter. It is not independent of us, of our thoughts, or of context. It can be argued instead, that truth is rather constrained by our abilities to verify it. And this is why it is constrained by our epistemic stance since it is to some degree an epistemic matter, and far from being an objective matter. This is why Tarski in previously cited work expressed the opinion that the ordinary notion of truth is incoherent and far from being scientific.

If images we communicate via can become distorted, if words do not represent the essence of things, if truth is difficult to determine, it seems that falsity cannot be fleshed out in order to avoid being trapped by it. This is what so-called redundancy theory is concerned with. It holds that there is no property of truth at all, and appearances of the expression "true" in our sentences are redundant, which means they have no effect on what we express [28, 27-54]. This is why the truth, exactly as knowledge, is difficult to identify.

It is highly questionable if a proposition can be absolutely true, the question arises to what extent some propositions are true or false, as it has been shown in Columbus' example. This is why there have been a variety of attempts to solve the difficulties posed by the aforementioned series of paradoxes. One of them is so-called "infallibilist" approach, which claims that only fallible support can be provided for any belief. But this is what Descartes wrote about in his "Meditations", i.e. overreliance on external senses which can fail to provide us with reliable knowledge. This is why we rarely obtain infallible justificatory support for any belief, and this is why we are not infallible knowers of truth, and we are fallible instead, which means that we are not knowers at all. But this reaction to paradoxes is regarded as not appropriate one since epistemologists strive to understand how we obtain at least some knowledge.

Conclusions. Plato never provides clear answers to questions he settles, instead gives only cues "that guide rightly", as Socrates says in "Meno" (99a), on what exactly true opinion and knowledge this case can be. As a result, ignorance (either simple or twofold) is a cause for mistakes, and wrong opinions or beliefs which turn to be a "twofold ignorance" cause false beliefs, as Socrates says in "Alcibiades" (118a), as it was discussed earlier [1]. Still the puzzle remains that, in spite of the fact that we might opine that each of us produces sentences which express true propositions, we are clearly disagreeing with each other [29, 643–686]. What can be suggested here as an answer is a resemblance of St. Thomas' "negative theology" which claims that the only knowledge that can be obtained about God is "what he is not" [12, 290-297]. It seems that these words can be applied to knowledge in general, although this view can be seen as rather skeptical.

The total absence of falsity is required for belief's being knowledge, ant this is why most beliefs can cease to be knowledge at all. And, on the other hand, so-called "negative" approach

places us well too far from obtaining any sufficient answers. This is where some epistemologists suggest applying "no false evidence proposal" in order to develop a non-skeptical approach, as it has already been mentioned in another context [6, 168-175]. According to the suggestion, the only thing which is required for belief to be knowledge is absence of significant element of falsity only. It means that wrong beliefs which are being used as evidence in the process of obtaining reliable knowledge are eliminable and this is why this kind of justification is adequate one for belief's being knowledge. Therefore, since false evidence sometimes plays a significant role in knowledge, such belief is far from being knowledge. But this approach appears to be quite weak as well, since false evidence is to be eliminated to some unknown extent. So, this still has yet to make significant inroads among scholars, and answers from epistemologists are still being awaited.

Since the beginning of Industrial Era overreliance of humanity on machines and computers has become expressively excessive. This is why there have been wide range of attempts to involve computers into the process of distinguishing of truth from falsity. But they proved to be of little help, since, for example, lie-detection techniques developed in the 20th Century are notoriously inaccurate. Partially it is so because there is a need to look for some answers behind the science. Scholars and scientists became excessively obsessed with computers and calculations, but identifying falsities appears to be more elusive and subtle to be performed by artificial intelligence which is still far from being perfect. Neither computer, nor any other machine can identify elusive and blurred boundaries between truth and falsity.

According to statistics, commonly applied academic standards of scientific evidence are usually misleading and fail to meet necessary standards to be at least slightly above chance [30]. It has been shown that humans are no better than chance at detecting deception [31, 137–149]. And, as well as Plato's theory of reminiscence can be proved neither by experience, nor by five basic senses, the boundaries between truth and falsity are elusive and cannot be distinctly set by any scientific method available today. It is difficult to do this, since being humans, we are highly biased. Daniel Goleman [32] argues that our view of human intelligence is far too narrow, and that our emotions play a far greater role in decision-making than it is generally estimated. It is apparent on the example of Russian propaganda, which performs brainwashing on a global scale aiming at achieving its dominance. It prevents those susceptible to it from being able to exercise their own will as well as free choice, since it undermines the intellect. But while applying a deeper insight, a person can become immune to this infestation.

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ПРО РІЗНИЦЮ МІЖ ПРАВДОЮ Й БРЕХНЕЮ

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Теорія ремінісценції Платона дає нам деякі підказки щодо природи знання. Його вважають досить невловимим, і це викликає потребу поставити під сумнів поняття істини в цілому. Немає жодних доказів, які дають нам право стверджувати, що ми володіємо будь-яким достовірним знанням, і тому мета дослідження поняття та основи поняття знання спрямована на з'ясування того, з чого саме складається знання. Найважливіші теорії істини аналізуються та беруться до уваги, щоб оцінити межі між двома протилежностями. Якщо те, що істина є істиною, має залежати від повної відсутності брехні, їх межі слід сприймати як чітко розрізнені. Але це потребує більш точного розуміння ширших проблем, пов'язаних із проблемою. Ця тема обговорюється в контексті широкого сприйняття Всесвіту. Теорії сучасних і постмодерністських мислителів сприймаються як успадкування тверджень Платона. Розглядаються певні підходи до сприйняття Всесвіту з метою вироблення прийнятного уявлення про межі між правдою та брехнею. Обізнаність і обман оцінюються, щоб визначити різницю між двома протилежностями. Повна відсутність хибності необхідна для того, щоб віра була знанням, і саме тому більшість вірувань взагалі можуть перестати бути знанням. У результаті дослідження аналізується феномен «промивання мізків». Теорія ремінісценції Платона не може бути підтверджена ні досвідом, ні п'ятьма основними відчуттями, межі між правдою та брехнею є невловимими і не можуть бути чітко встановлені жодним науковим методом, доступним сьогодні. Зробити це важко, оскільки, будучи людьми, ми дуже упереджені. Це видно на прикладі російської пропаганди, яка здійснює промивання мізків у світовому масштабі з метою досягнення свого панування. Це заважає тим, хто вразливий до нього, мати можливість здійснювати власну волю, а також вільний вибір.

Ключові слова: правда, брехня, промивання мізків, обман, межі.